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This paper examines the implications of adopting alternative value judgements 
when evaluating future consumption streams in the context of damage abatement. The 
paper focusses on a form of ‘sustainable preferences’ designed to avoid either a 
dictatorship by present or by future generations which can arise when using a ‘standard’ 
social welfare function. Numerical examples are reported, based on a simple growth 
model, under alternative damage abatement parameters and welfare functions. The 
results illustrate how sustainable preferences effectively reduce the damages on future 
consumption by shifting consumption from the present to the future. This implies an 
intergenerational trade-off. An explicit policy of damage abatement under a standard 
social welfare function implies a similar intergenerational trade-off. However, the 
results suggest that damage abatement does not penalise current generations as much 
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1  Introduction 
This paper examines the implications of adopting alternative value judgements 
when evaluating consumption streams over a very long period. In particular the use of a 
social welfare function with a positive and constant pure time preference rate is 
compared with value judgements reflecting ‘sustainable preferences’, following 
Chichilnisky (1997), Heal (1998) and Li and Lofgren (2000). This involves the use of a 
social welfare function for which neither the present nor the future is favoured over the 
other (Chichilnisky, 1997, p. 468). It contrasts with a ‘standard approach’ in which 
either the present or the future dominates, depending on whether the time preference 
rate of the judge is positive or zero.  
The alternative forms of social welfare function are used to examine, within the 
framework of a simple growth model, the resulting optimal time path of consumption. 
The context involves a policy designed to reduce some form of damage, arising in the 
long term, by devoting current and future resources to abatement.
1 The abatement policy 
imposes costs on current and future generations in order to reduce damages that are 
expected to increase over a long time horizon. Generic abatement and damage functions 
are used, so no attempt is made to model the damage-generating process from any 
particular phenomenon such as climate change or population ageing. Rather emphasis is 
on trying to understand the nature of and implications of adopting alternative value 
judgements. This is important in view of the extensive and heated debates in a range of 
contexts involving long term plans. The arguments suggest that the standard form of 
social welfare function used to evaluate consumption streams reflects value judgements 
with which not everyone would agree.  
Section 2 briefly discusses the general notion of sustainability adopted in the 
growth model applied later in this paper. Section 3 briefly presents the ‘standard model’ 
and discusses the familiar ethical dilemma arising from discounting. Koopmans (1960) 
pointed out that time preference is required so that the infinite future does not 
completely dominate the present. Here the dilemma becomes clear: discounting solves 
this problem but means that the distant future is disregarded in favour of the present. 
Section 4 describes the value judgements described by Chichilnisky as involving 
                                                 
1 The related issues of uncertainty and irreversibility surrounding the long term effects of phenomena 
such as climate change and population ageing are ignored here, thereby avoiding questions about option 
values; for discussion of these see Arrow and Fisher (1974).   2
‘sustainable preferences’
2, along with the variant of Li and Lofgren (2000), whose 
slightly different approach results in a similar optimal path towards an identical 
stationary solution as the time horizon becomes infinitely large. Section 5 describes the 
growth model, along with the specification of damages and abatement functions, used to 
examine alternative preferences. Section 6 presents numerical results of applying 
alternative value judgements for different values of key parameters, and Section 7 
concludes.  
2  The Concept of Sustainability 
If sustainability is to be made operational it must be defined and it must be 
measured. As Solow (1992, p. 163) said about sustainability, ‘talk without measurement 
is cheap’. The Brundtland Commission (United Nations, 1987) defined sustainable 
development as development that, ‘meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. 
Some critics have suggested that the Brundland definition is too vague to be of 
use as a practical guide to planning; see Stavins et al. (2003). For example, a society 
living forever at a minimum subsistence level of consumption would satisfy the 
Brundtland requirement, but it would obviously be wasteful in terms of foregone 
opportunities to use resources to improve well-being. However, others argue that the 
notion of sustainable development is inevitably vague, but not necessarily meaningless 
(Solow, 2005). One definition, suggested by Solow (1992), that is both imprecise but 
meaningful defines sustainable development as an obligation to leave behind a 
generalised capacity to create well-being. This implies an obligation to give future 
generations the capacity to be as well off as the present by preserving the existing 
capacity for material development. That is, future generations are not owed any 
particular thing - rather they are owed a capacity to enjoy a level of well-being at least 
equal to that of the present. As Aghion and Howitt (1998) put it, ‘sustainability doesn’t 
require that any particular species of owl or any particular species of fish or any 
particular tract of forest be preserved’. The implication is that all forms of capital, 
reproducible capital and natural capital for example, are substitutable to some extent in 
generating well-being. 
                                                 
2 She cited Solow’s term, ‘intertemporally equitable preferences’ as an alternative description.   3
This is the general interpretation of sustainability implicitly adopted in this 
paper. The growth model developed and applied below has one generalised 
consumption good and one generalised form of capital. Hence damages to one form of 
capital which results in a loss of consumption can be compensated by building up other 
forms of capital which can replace the lost consumption. However, this general 
interpretation is not sufficient to define a unique sustainable path of consumption over 
time and therefore among generations. For example, with technical progress many paths 
of consumption would be sustainable in the sense that future generations are at least as 
well off as current generations; but some paths would see future generations better off 
than they would be under other paths. There is therefore a need to go further than 
Solow’s definition of sustainability in order to define a unique consumption path. This 
requires an explicit valuation of future well-being that imposes, as Chichilnisky (1997) 
puts it, neither a ‘dictatorship of the present’ nor a ‘dictatorship of the future’. Before 
considering such value judgements in detail, the following section discusses the 
standard form of welfare function that is extensively used in cost-benefit studies.  
3  A Standard Welfare Function and Time Preference 
Consider a time stream of consumption per capita, Ct, over the period  1,..., tT = , 
where  T represents a long time horizon. For simplicity, assume zero population growth 
and homogeneous consumption needs of the population.
3 A ‘standard’ approach is to 
examine the implications of adopting an additive Paretian social welfare function, 











=+ ∑  (1) 
Here  ( ) WC is a weighting function representing the weight attached by the judge to 
consumption and ρ is the constant pure rate of time preference.
4 Alternative value 
judgements can be specified by the selection of different forms of W (in particular with 
different degrees of concavity) and values of ρ. In the vast majority of studies, the 
                                                 
3 If consumption needs differ with respect to age then C requires further clarification. In particular, it 
matters whether the social welfare function is expressed in terms of average consumption per equivalent 
person, or in terms of the ratio of average consumption to the average equivalent size; see Creedy and 
Guest (forthcoming). 
4 This is often referred to as a ‘utility discount rate’, from the different context of individual lifetime 
optimisation. Here, W is not a utility function.   4
implications of allowing W to take the isoelastic form  ( ) ( )
1 /1
t t WC C
β β
− = −  are 
considered. Hence β  is the constant ‘elasticity of marginal valuation’, which can be 
interpreted in terms of a constant relative aversion to variability over time. 
Maximisation of V subject to a wealth constraint gives rise to the familiar Euler 





=−  (2) 
where  t g  is the growth rate of consumption and  t r  represents the rate of interest (and 
the marginal product of capital, net of depreciation, in a closed economy model). 
Rearranging this gives the ‘Ramsey equation’,  tt rg ρ β = + , so that along the optimal 
path, the judge equates the marginal product of capital (the return from saving),  t r , with 
the marginal cost of saving, represented by  t g ρ β +  which is often called the 
consumption discount rate. There is no necessary relationship between ρ  and β  on 
ethical grounds, but in a small open economy the two are related by the condition that 
tt rg ρ β =−  where rt,  β and gt are all given. This condition ensures that consumption 
growth cannot deviate from output growth permanently as that would imply either 
permanently accumulating or decumulating foreign assets. 
A number of authors have argued that a pure time preference rate of zero should 
be imposed. This clearly involves an attempt, using various rhetorical devices, to 
impose their own value judgements. Famous examples include Ramsey (1928, p.543) 
and Pigou (1932, p. 25).
5 However, Ramsey (1928) realised that without discounting, 
infinite utility streams would be non-convergent and therefore could not be ordered. His 
solution was to measure utility over time as a cumulative sum of the distance from a 
‘bliss’ level of utility, but the main problem with this approach is the arbitrariness of the 
level of bliss.  
One way of achieving a partial ordering of infinite utility streams without 
discounting is the overtaking criterion; see von Weizacker (1965). This says that utility 
stream A is preferred to utility stream B if, after some finite time period, T, the 
cumulative utility of stream A is remains greater than stream B for all time t > T. 
However this is only a partial ordering of utility streams because one stream may 
oscillate above and below another stream indefinitely – it may never permanently 
                                                 
5 See also Padilla (2002) and Caplin and Leahy (2000).   5
overtake. Also, rather than replacing the need for discounting, the overtaking criterion 
comes close to Koopmans’ axiomatic defence of discounting, because it implies that, 
for example, utility stream A:{0,1,0,0,….} is preferred to stream B:{0,0,1,0,0,…}. 
Stream B is stream A lagged one period. Hence stream A overtakes stream B in period 1 
but is identical thereafter. Thus the preference for the overtaking stream reflects a time 
preference, as noted by Heal (1998). 
The failure to rank all utility streams also applies to the Rawlsian criterion, 
which ranks the maxi-min utility stream above all others but fails to rank the others 
among each other. Similarly, an objective function that ranks the satisfaction of basic 
needs above all other outcomes fails to rank other outcomes. 
The standard welfare function discussed above imposes a constant time 
preference rate. However, a number of authors have suggested using a rate which 
declines over time, that is, a hyperbolic time preference function (Laibson, 1996). 
Indeed, a feature of sustainable preferences discussed in the following section is that 
they imply a form of hyperbolic preferences. Both constant and hyperbolic time 






+ , that decline at a decreasing rate; 
that is, the second derivative with respect to time is positive.  
However, within this framework it is also possible to consider value judgements 
such that the time preference function is logistic. This implies that the judge’s concern, 
refected in the discount factor, at time 0 for the well-being of individuals living in time t 
> 0  declines relatively slowly as t is increased, but then begins to decline at an 
increasing rate. Hence the judge cares almost as much about generations in the near 
future as the present generation, but this concern at some point begins to diminish more 
rapidly. This decline could not accelerate forever as the discount factor cannot be 
negative, so it would have to tail off after some point, with a point of inflexion. A 
logistic time preference rate function describes such intertemporal preferences.
6 Their 
implications for the optimal consumption path are briefly reported below. 
                                                 
6 Appendix Figures A1 and A2 compare the time preference functions, 







respectively, for the case of logistic preferences and the case of sustainable preferences discussed in the 
next section.   6
4  Sustainable Preferences 
This section describes alternative social welfare function specifications which 
embody sustainable preferences and thus place a positive value on very long run 
outcomes. Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 examine in turn the value judgements specified by 
Chichilnisky (1997) and Li and Lofgren (2000).  
4.1  A Chichilnisky Social Welfare Function 
Chichilnisky (1997) proposed an approach which assigns declining weights over 
time and then some extra weight to the last period. The judge’s evaluation function thus 
consists of a weighted average of two terms: the sum of discounted values where the 
pure rate of time preference declines over time and the (undiscounted) value in the final 
period, T , which the judge chooses to be long way into the future. Hence the social 
welfare function is of the form
7: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1




VW C W C θρ θ ρ θ
−
=
′ =+ + − < < < ∑  (3) 
In explaining the choice of a declining, or hyperbolic discount rate in the first 
term in (3), represented by  0 t ρ ′ < , Chichilnisky (p.468) refers to experimental 
evidence that the relative weight that people give to two subsequent periods in the 
future is inversely related to the distance of the two periods from today. This evidence 
suggest that it is worth examining the implications of a judge adopting such value 
judgements.
8  
Chichilnisky (1997) proved that a hyperbolic discount rate in (3) is a necessary 
condition for an optimal path to exist in the limit as T approaches infinity. A constant 
discount rate would not yield a solution. Adding the second term in (3),() ( ) 1 T WC θ − , 
gives explicit recognition to consumption in the very long run, at time T. Taking a 
weighted average of the two terms implies a trade-off between the present and the 
future, yet neither need dominate completely. 
                                                 
7 Chichilnisky’s objective function differs from (3) in that in her model the weighting function, which she 
calls utility, U,  rather than W is derived from both consumption, c, and a flow of services from the stock 
of natural capital, s. This implies an optimal combination of c and s at any time t. However, dropping s 
from the utility function, as we do here, doesn’t affect the notion of sustainable preferences, the key 
ingredients of which are a declining discount rate applied to U() and the second additive term in (3). 
8 It does not of course support the argument that evaluations should take this form (there is no legitimate 
route from ‘is’ to ‘ought’).   7
These preferences are subject to the standard criticism of time inconsistency that 
applies to hyperbolic preferences since these are reflected in the first term in (3). But 
this criticism is weak when the objective is a socially optimal consumption path. From a 
social choice perspective, Heal (1998) argued that over time, new generations arrive and 
older ones drop out of the choice process, so there is no reason why the preferences of 
generations who have dropped out should be imposed on new generations in the name 
of time consistency.  
Heal (1998) shows that as T →∞, the effect on the optimal path of the term 
() ( ) 1 T WC θ − drops out. In other words in the limit the optimal path converges to the 
stationary solution from maximising (3) without the second additive term. This limiting 
solution is what Chichilnisky and Heal call the “green golden rule” which is the 
analogue to the Phelps golden rule in a Ramsey model. The green golden rule applies 
where natural capital generates a flow of services that yield utility directly in addition to 
the utility derived from a general consumption good. In the Ramsey model utility is 
derived only from the general consumption good. 
4.2  A Modified Li and Lofgren Social Welfare Function 
This subsection describes the social welfare function reflecting sustainable 
preferences introduced by Li and Lofgren (2000), with minor differences.
9 It is assumed 
that society is composed of two representative individuals who have utility functions 
specified over T years, where T is large and spans multiple future life spans on the basis 
that the individuals care about their offspring.
10 One individual discounts the future at a 
constant rate and the other does not discount. Individual 1 who is the discounter has a 









VU C A ρ
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=+ ∑  (4) 
In this case ρ represents the pure rate of time preference of the individual, and U is the 
utility at time t derived from consumption of C1,t and damage abatement, At (discussed 
further below). Damage abatement is a public good and therefore both representative 
individuals receive the same level of At. 
                                                 
9 The differences are that the model here is in discrete time, replaces the conservationist in Li and Lofgren 
with a more generic person who may be thought of as a conservationist in the context of climate change, 
and damage abatement, A, replaces the environmental capital stock. 
10 Following Barro (1974), all generations are effectively linked if parents care about their offspring, in 
which case they plan their consumption as though they will live forever.   8









=∑  (5) 
The judge’s evaluation, or social welfare, function is assumed to be a weighted 
average of the utilities of the two individuals: 
() 12 1            0 1 VV V αα α =+ − ≤ ≤  (6) 
This approach is therefore different from the approach in Section 2 where the 
judge applied a weighting function to per capita consumption that reflected the judge’s 
preferences rather than the preferences of individuals in the society. That approach 
implied that no matter how individuals in society may actually discount the future in 
their private consumption decisions and whatever the degree of concavity of their utility 
functions (the elasticity of marginal utility), the welfare function embodies only value 
judgements of the judge. Here, in (4), the pure time preference rate reflects the 
properties of individual 1, rather than those of the judge.  However, the judge’s 
preferences are not irrelevant – they are embodied in the relative preferences for each 
individual’s welfare as reflected in the parameter α in (6).
11  
It is shown in the Appendix that the social welfare function (6) implies a 
hyperbolic effective social rate of time preference. The Appendix also shows that the 
rate of decline of the effective social rate of time preference depends on the 
consumption shares of the two individuals which in turn depends on the judge’s 
preference parameter, α. The effect on the path of optimal consumption of α is 
investigated by using the growth model presented in the following section. 
5  A Closed Economy with Damage and Abatement Functions 
This section presents a model in which there are damages in the form of future 
costs which can be to some extent avoided by a costly abatement policy. The model is 
used in the next section to examine the implications of adopting the modified Li and 
Lofgren evaluation function.  
                                                 
11 It would be possible to rewrite the model such that individuals 1 and 2 are representing types, so that 
α  measures the population share of type 1 individuals. If this latter interpretation is taken, the welfare 
function is in fact equivalent to a ‘classical utilitarian’ evaluation function, that is, a simple sum of 
individuals’ utilities. However, this would require aggregate consumption, in the specification of the 
following subsection, to be expressed as a weighted sum rather than a simple sum of the two consumption 
values.     9
5.1  Structure of the Model 
Consider a closed economy which incurs in period t a cost, t A , of abating a 
potential future cost. This may be thought of as a pollution abatement cost or a cost of 
policies designed to reduce problems associated with, say, population ageing. The 
precise context is not important here as the aim is simply to investigate the way in 
which evaluation using a form of sustainable preferences affects policy judgements. 
The judge maximises (6) subject to the closed economy accounting constraint: 
tt t t YCIA =+ +  (7) 
where Yt is output, Ct is aggregate consumption equal to  1, 2, tt CC + , and It is investment. 
Abatement is a policy variable and is assumed to be a constant proportion, ε, of GDP 
lagged one period. Hence  1 tt AY ε − = . Investment is given by: 
() 1 1 tt t I KK δ − =− −  (8) 
where Kt is the capital stock and δ is a constant rate of depreciation. The final capital 
stock at time T is subject to the constraint that * T KK = . Output is a function of the 




























The parameter μ is a damage scaling factor and ω is the elasticity of damages with 
respect to (lagged) total consumption. The parameter, z, is an abatement effectiveness 
term, measuring how much a given damage abatement expenditure, At, actually reduces 
damages. Abatement expenditure reduces damages both directly, through the term Atz, 
and indirectly by diverting resources from consumption, thereby reducing  t C .
13  
The damage function in (10) generates a pattern of damages which increases 
slowly for an initial period then accelerates for an intermediate period before slowing 
down to approach an asymptote in the long run. This is consistent with typical 
modelling approaches such as Stern (2007, p.665) which assumed that damages cease to 
                                                 
12 Population growth is assumed to be zero, so labour inputs do not need to be included explicitly here.  
13 Environmental damages are obviously positively related to consumption but this is probably not true of 
‘damages’ from population ageing.   10
increase after the year 2200 implying that the problem is contained after this time. The 
length and acceleration of damages in (10) can be varied through the parameter x. 
However there is no attempt here to model the underlying process generating damages 
as a function of variables other than time, such as temperature change or demographic 
change. This process simply assumed to be captured in a stylised way by a logistic 
function.
14  
Damage abatement policies with respect to climate change and population 
ageing impose costs on current and future generations in order to reduce damages that 
are expected to increase over time. In the case of climate change, the policy is a 
mechanism to reduce greenhouse gases (such as a carbon tax or tradable pollution 
permits). In the case of population ageing the mechanisms include measures to smooth 
the fiscal costs of ageing and tax incentives to boost labour force participation. Again, 
these mechanisms are not modelled in detail here. 
The utility function U(Ct, At) is assumed to be additively separable in Ct and At 
on the assumption that people’s valuation of another unit of abatement is independent of 
the level of consumption and vice versa. Each separable part in the utility function is 





























 where Φ is a parameter reflecting relative preferences for 
abatement. In this context the parameter β  reflects the elasticity of marginal utility of 
consumption of the individuals themselves (in contrast with the elasticity of marginal 
valuation of the independent judge in the standard approach discussed in Section 3). 
Since At is a common resource, both individuals consume the same amount at any time: 
At. The two individuals are assumed to have the same parameters in their utility 
functions and therefore the only distinguishing feature in their utility functions is the 
pure rate of time preference, which is zero for individual 2.  
The optimal plan chosen by the independent judge, which maximises V subject 
to the constraints give above, is obtained by forming the following Lagrangian: 
                                                 
14 Nordhaus (1994), for example, models damages as a function of temperature changes.   11
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It is therefore necessary to derive the Euler equation describing the growth rate 
of aggregate consumption for each time period. In the Appendix it is shown that this is 
given by the following, where a dot above the variable indicates a first difference such 
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 (13) 
Examination of (12), and comparison with (2), shows that, although the social 
welfare function does not contain an explicit pure time preference rate of the judge, it 
actually implies an effective time preference rate in each period of  ( ) 2, 1 tt CC ρ − . It 
therefore depends on the ratio of person 2’s consumption to total consumption in that 
period. Furthermore, it is shown that  2, lim 1 tt t CC
→∞ → , so that ultimately the individual 
who does not discount dominates completely. Hence the judge’s implied pure time 
preference rate is hyperbolic, with an asymptote of zero.  
5.2  A Solution Procedure 
The values of C, K and Y are solved as follows. An initial steady state is 
assumed with C, K and Y constant and D0 = 0. The initial capital stock, K0, and initial 
output, Y0, are determined from the production function, (9), given an assumed initial 
value of (K0/Y0). Initial consumption, C0, is given by  00 YI − where  00 I K δ = . The steady 
state is then shocked by allowing Dt to follow the damages function given above. The 
new steady state is found by a shooting algorithm in which an arbitrary initial level of 
consumption is chosen and variables solved forward using the above Euler equation for 
consumption and the equations for investment, output and capital stock. Repeated initial   12
values of consumption are chosen until the target level of capital stock,  0 T KK =  , is 
achieved. 
6  Implications of Alternative Value Judgements 
An explicit policy of damage abatement ( ) 0 ε > is one way of protecting future 
consumption from the costs of damages. Another (not mutually exclusive) way is for 
the social judge to apply alternative value judgements, reflected in the parameter α in 
the intertemporal social welfare function that represents sustainable social preferences. 
Cases where 01 α ≤< represent sustainable preferences as defined here, and the case 
where  1 α =  represents the standard approach in which the social rate of time 
preference is constant.
15 This section applies the growth model presented in the previous 
section to consider the implications for Ct of such alternative value judgements, 
compared with the implications of an explicit damage abatement policy. Both methods 
of protecting future consumption – damage abatement and sustainable preferences – 
shift consumption forward in time. However, in the latter case the cost of damages on 
consumption is compensated by creating a higher stock of capital.  
6.1  Calibration of the Model 
The benchmark parameter values are given in Table 1. The first two parameters 
in the table, μ and ω, determine the scale of damages and their responsiveness to 
consumption. The parameter, x, is the logistic function parameter determining the 
underlying response of damages over time. Next are the damage abatement expenditure, 
ε, and damage effectiveness, z, parameters. The parameters are chosen such that the 
damage function before and after abatement is consistent with the magnitude and 
pattern of climate change damages projected in Stern (2007).  
The remaining parameters relate to production function and preferences. The 
values of these parameters are typical values used in such models. The solution is found 
by searching numerically for a new value of consumption at the time that the damages 
shock is revealed (t = 1) that ensures that the terminal condition is met.  
 
 
                                                 
15 Furthermore, the utility functions in the Li and Lofgren approach are considered to be weighting 
functions of the judge in the standard model.    13
Table 1 Benchmark Parameter Values 
Scaling factor for damages, μ        0.25
Elasticity of damages with respect to consumption, ω  0.20
Rate of increase in damages, x     0.08
Damage abatement expenditure as a ratio of GDP, ε  0.01
Abatement effectiveness, z     5.0
Time horizon, T     200
Capital elasticity of output, γ     0.25
Initial capital to output ratio, (K/Y)0    3.0
Depreciation rate, δ     0.05
Elasticity of marginal valuation, β    2.0
Time preference rate, ρ     0.035
 
 
6.2  Numerical Results 
Figure 1 shows four illustrative series of damages as a percentage of GDP. The 
series represent damages with and without abatement for each of two values, α = 1 and 
α = 0.5. The damages ratio depends on α because damages depend on the path of 
aggregate consumption which depends on α, and also because GDP depends on α 
through its effect on capital accumulation (lower α implies greater capital accumulation 
and therefore higher GDP). Gross damages (that is, without abatement) rise from zero to 
20 percent of GDP after 100 years for α = 1 and to 23 per cent for α = 0. Damage 
abatement reduces net damages by about 5 per cent of GDP.  These levels of gross 
damages are consistent with the projected damages from climate change in Stern (2006) 
of 5 to 20 percent, and also similar to the projected costs to GDP per capita of 
population ageing in OECD countries - a cost of between 10 and 15 per cent is 
commonly projected for OECD countries (see for example Martins et al., 2005).    14
 




































Figure 2 Consumption with Alternative Welfare Functions:  
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Figure 4 Consumption with Damage Abatement:  
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Figure 2 plots consumption per capita under alternative models of preferences: 
the standard model in which α = 1, the sustainable preferences model (for α = 0.2, α = 
0.5, and α = 0.9), and logistic preferences for the functional form illustrated in Figure 
A1. There is no damage abatement in Figure 2 – abatement is introduced in Figure 3. In 
all cases in Figure 2 consumption is ultimately lower as a result of the damages shock.
16 
Compared with conventional preferences (α = 1), consumption under sustainable 
preferences (α < 1) is initially lower, but ultimately higher. This is because the social 
rate of time preference in the sustainable preference model , ( ) 2, 1 tt CC ρ − is less 
thanρ , which is in turn due to the effect on social welfare of the utility of the individual 
who has a zero rate of pure time preference.  A lower social rate of time preference 
implies a lower desire to substitute present consumption for future consumption. The 
result is a flatter consumption path. Consumption remains higher in the long run 
because a higher capital stock is created by sacrificing consumption in the early years.  
The higher consumption under sustainable preferences implies higher damages, 
since damages are a function of consumption (10), but the resulting negative feedback 
effect on consumption is outweighed by the positive effect on consumption of the 
higher capital stock created by sacrificing consumption earlier on. Sustainable 
preferences therefore protect consumption in the long run compared with the outcome 
under standard value judgements. 
Comparing the three cases of sustainable preferences in Figure 2 (α = 0.2, α = 
0.5, and α = 0.9), the lower the value of α the greater the fall in current consumption 
and the higher the level of consumption in the long run. This is because a lower value of 
α implies a higher relative weight given to person who does not discount the future. Yet 
even a small regard for that person’s welfare (for example, α=0.9) implies an 
appreciable reduction in consumption. The time stream of consumption under 
sustainable preferences is also different in that it does not decline monotonically. It 
follows a hump shape which is more accentuated the lower is the value of α. This can 





and t Ω  , all 
of which depend on α. 
                                                 
16 ‘Lower consumption’ means lower than the level before the damages shock. If allowance were made 
for labour productivity growth, consumption may still be higher in absolute terms notwithstanding 
damages.   17
Figure 2 includes a ‘logistic’ path of consumption, derived from a logistic time 
preference function discussed at the end of Section 3 and illustrated in Appendix Figure 
A1. This generates an even larger initial reduction in consumption than in the 
sustainable preferences model, because the concern for the well-being of close 
descendants is highest for this preference specification. The implications of the logistic 
preference function are not discussed further. 
Figure 3 introduces damage abatement at two levels: ε = 0.01 and ε = 0.02, and 
shows that damage abatement protects consumption in the long run in the same way as 
sustainable preferences, as discussed in Figure 2 – that is, by shifting consumption from 
present generations to future generations. However, this is achieved by damage 
reduction directly through abatement, rather than through capital creation. The sacrifice 
in initial consumption is lower, however, to achieve a given increase in future 
consumption. This is partly because abatement expenditure has a dual effect on 
damages. There is a direct reduction, through the term  t Az in the damage function (10), 
and an indirect reduction by diverting resources away from consumption which lowers 
damages through the term  1 t C
ω μ − in (10).  
Figure 4 shows the combined effect of damage abatement and sustainable 
preferences on consumption. Given sustainable preferences (denoted in this case by α = 
0.5), no further loss of current consumption is incurred by introducing damage 
abatement, yet the gain to future generations is greater. This is evident from a 
comparison of the three series in Figure 4 for α = 0.5. Among these three cases, greater 
damage abatement does not reduce current consumption but it significantly increases 
future consumption. Certainly current consumption is lower in all three cases than under 
conventional preferences (denoted by the α = 1 series), but there is no further loss of 
current consumption by introducing damage abatement. This is different from the case 
of the standard welfare function, shown in Figure 3, where a higher damage abatement 
implies a greater loss of consumption.  
The numerical examples shown in Figure 4 therefore suggest that the terms of 
the intergenerational trade-off implied by damage abatement policy are different under 
sustainable preferences compared with the standard welfare function. The suggestion is 
that the cost to current generations is relatively smaller under sustainable preferences. 
The terms of the intergenerational trade-off under both social welfare functions 
depend on the parameters in Table 1, in particular, the abatement effectiveness   18
parameter, z. The base case value of 5 was chosen in order to generate a reduction of 
damages of 25 percent, from about 20 percent of GDP to about 15 percent of GDP, after 
100 years. As a sensitivity check, the abatement effectiveness parameter is halved to 
2.5. In this case, under conventional preferences, damage abatement results in a cost to 
current generations that is larger and lasts longer than it does for z = 5. However, for 
sustainable preferences (and assuming α = 0.5) damage abatement leaves current 
generations no worse off, which is the same result reported for the z = 5 case. This 
supports the suggestion that damage abatement does not penalise current generations as 
much under sustainable preferences as under the standard welfare function. 
However, it is worth emphasising that the consumption paths resulting from all 
of these computations are the outcomes of optimal adjustments to consumption by an 
independent judge over a very long period of time. This framework is both a strength 
and a weakness. The strength is that the parsimony of the model allows the effects of 
ethical judgements and fundamental economic forces to be explored in a transparent 
way. It is worth investigating in a simple model how the optimal path responds to 
alternative assumptions about damages, damage abatement and ethical judgements 
about intergenerational equity. The weakness is that the model abstracts from many 
observed behavioural factors and exogenous forces, and it ignores distortions in markets 
that create deviations between the outcomes of a planned economy and a decentralised 
economy. These weaknesses restrict but do not disable the model as a tool for 
investigating the effects on consumption streams of alternative value in the context of 
damage abatement. 
7  Conclusions 
This paper investigated, using numerical examples based on a simple growth 
model, the effect on optimal consumption streams of sustainable preferences in the 
context of damage abatement. Sustainable preferences address the dilemma that arises 
in applying the standard social welfare function, with positive time preference, in 
dealing with damages arising from phenomena having very long run consequences such 
as climate change, nuclear waste disposal and population ageing. The perceived 
problem with discounting is that it discriminates against future generations. But the 
problem with not discounting is that it discriminates against present generations.   19
Sustainable preferences balance the interests of present and future generations by 
implying a declining, or hyperbolic, discount rate with respect to time.  
The results indicate that sustainable preferences protect long run consumption in 
the face of long run damages, by shifting consumption from the present to the future. 
Even a small deviation from the standard welfare function (a value of α  only slightly 
below 1) produces a ‘humped’ optimal profile of consumption over time, compared 
with a continuously decreasing profile with the standard social welfare function). A 
similar shift in consumption arises from a policy of damage abatement. However, the 
terms of the intergenerational trade-off implied by a policy of damage abatement are 
different under sustainable preferences compared with the standard approach. The 
examples suggest that damage abatement does not penalise current generations as much, 
if at all, under sustainable preferences as it does under the standard approach. 
The basic position adopted here is that the appropriate role of economists is not 
to impose their own value judgements but to investigate the implications of adopting 
alternative value judgements and to clarify precisely what is involved in specifying 
social welfare functions. Within the context of the ‘standard’ approach to evaluating 
consumption streams, the range of value judgements is restricted (to variations in the 
elasticity of marginal valuation and the time preference rate) and dominance either by 
the present or a distant future generation is implied. The social welfare function implied 
by sustainable preferences therefore appears to offer a useful additional alternative 
when considering sensitivity analyses.    20
Appendix A. Derivation of Euler Equation for Growth 
Model 
This Appendix derives the Euler equation for the growth model described in Section 5, 
with the modified Li and Lofgren (2000) specification of the social welfare function. 
From the Lagrangian in equation (11) above, the following first order conditions are 
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and for t=T: 
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The Euler equation can be obtained in the following three stages. First, from 
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 as defined in (13) above.  
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Taking natural logarithms, using a dot to indicate a first difference and using the 
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This result gives the Euler equation for person 1’s consumption path. Except for 
the last term which depends on the damage and production functions, this takes the 
familiar form as given in equation (2) above, letting rt in (2) equal ( ) t YK δ ′ − . However, 
it is necessary to derive the Euler equation for total consumption, so the next stage 
involves obtaining a relationship between the growth rates of consumption for the two 
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For periods t and t+1, this gives: 
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Thus the optimal growth rate of person 2’s consumption is equal to that of person 1, 
plus the ratio of 1’s pure time preference rate to the common elasticity of marginal 
utility of consumption. Clearly, a higher value of the latter implies a higher aversion to 
variability of consumption over time, so the difference in the optimal growth rate for 
person 2 is correspondingly lower.    22
The third and final stage involves combining the above results to obtain the 
aggregate Euler equation. By definition: 
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from (25) into (26) yields 
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 can be interpreted as the 







C →∞ →  (29) 
which, substituting into (28), implies that the social rate of time preference is hyperbolic 
and asymptotes to zero over time (Li and Lofgren, 2000, p. 238).   23
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